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Recent Decisions
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-TAX Ex-
EMPT STATUs-The United States Supreme Court has held that
private schools which practice racial discrimination are not chari-
table organizations within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code and thus do not qualify for tax exempt status under section
501(c)(3).
Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
Before 1970, the Internal Revenue Service frequently granted
tax-exempt status to private schools without regard to their racial
admissions practices, under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code,' and permitted charitable deductions for contributions
to such schools under section 170 of the Code.' In July of 1970, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) discontinued its long standing
practice of granting tax exemptions to private schools that prac-
ticed racial discrimination after reinterpreting both sections and
concluding that they embraced the common law concept of char-
ity.3 This concept, according to the IRS, required institutions to
show that their activities were not contrary to public policy before
they qualified for tax benefits.4 In its opinion, racial discrimination
clearly violated public policy. Therefore, the IRS concluded that it
could no longer legally justify granting tax exemptions and charita-
ble deductions to private schools that practiced such
discrimination."
1. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2021 (1983). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1983).
2. 103 S. Ct. at 2021. I.R.C. § 170 (1983).
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2025. This new policy was formalized in Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-
2 C.B. 230.
4. 103 S. Ct. at 2025.
5. Id. at 2021. The IRS policy which was formalized in Revenue Ruling 71-447 was a
response to a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia on January 12, 1970. In its opinion, the district court held that racially discriminatory
private schools were not entitled to exemption under section 501(c)(3) and that donors were
not entitled to deductions for contributions to such schools under section 170. See Green v.
Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
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One school that had enjoyed the benefits of tax-exempt status
was Bob Jones University. In November of 1970, the IRS formally
notified the university of its intention to challenge the tax-exempt
status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in their
admissions policies. In response, the university, in 1971, instituted
an action in which it sought to enjoin the IRS from revoking the
school's tax-exempt status. That suit was ultimately appealed to
the United States Supreme Court which decided that the Anti-In-
junction Act of the Internal Revenue Code prohibited the univer-
sity from obtaining an injunction before the assessment or collec-
tion of any tax.8 Thereafter, on January 19, 1976, the IRS formally
revoked the university's tax-exempt status, effective as of Decem-
ber 1, 1970. 9
Subsequent to the cancellation of its tax-exempt status, the
university filed tax returns under the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act for the years 1970 through 1975.10 After its request for a re-
fund was denied, the university went to federal court seeking to
recover the taxes it had paid to the IRS." In response, the govern-
ment counterclaimed for unpaid federal unemployment taxes to-
talling $489,675.59, plus interest, which the university owed for the
years 1971 to 1975.12
The United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina found for the university;13 however, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed.1 4 According to the court of appeals, in
6. 103 S. Ct. at 2023. The directors of the university sincerely believed that the Bible
prohibited interracial dating and marriage. To effectuate their view, the directors com-
pletely excluded Blacks from all levels of the university until 1971. From 1971 to 1975, the
university accepted applications from Blacks married within their race, and since May of
1975, unmarried Blacks were permitted to enroll. However, the school's disciplinary code
continued to prohibit interracial dating and marriage, and the university continued to deny
admission to applicants engaged in or known to advocate interracial dating or marriage. Id.
at 2022-23.
7. Id. at 2023.
8. Id. See Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1983).




13. Id. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina held that
termination of the university's tax-exempt status "exceeded the delegated powers of the
IRS, was improper under the IRS rulings and procedures, and violated the university's
rights under the religion clauses of the first amendment." Id. See Bob Jones University v.
United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D.S.C. 1978).




order for the university to receive a tax exemption under section
501(c)(3), it had to be a charitable organization not contrary to
public policy. 5 The court concluded that the university did not
meet this requirement because its racial policies were in conflict
with deeply rooted public policies condemning racial discrimina-
tion.1" The court remanded the case to the district court with in-
structions to dismiss the university's claim for a refund and to re-
instate the IRS counterclaim.
17
Unlike Bob Jones University, Goldsboro Christian Schools, the
second petitioner in this case, never enjoyed the benefits of tax-
exempt status. 8 In fact, after an audit for the years 1969 through
1972, the IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an organization
described in section 501(c)(3) and therefore was required to pay
taxes under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act and the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act.1"
Goldsboro paid the IRS $3,459.93 in taxes for one employee for
the years 1969 through 1972 and thereafter sought a refund in fed-
eral court claiming that tax-exempt status had been improperly
denied.20 The government counterclaimed for $160,073.96 in un-
paid taxes for the years 1969 through 1972.21 The District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that Goldsboro's
practice of admitting, for the most part, only white students was
discriminatory, and even though the discriminatory policy was
based on sincerely held religious beliefs, Goldsboro's claim for tax-
exempt status had to be denied.22 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Both Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools pe-
titioned the Supreme Court for review. After granting certiorari,
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2023-24. See 639 F.2d at 151.
16. 103 S. Ct. at 2024. See 639 F.2d at 151.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2024. The circuit court concluded that the granting of tax exemptions
to such an institution violated the governmental policy against subsidizing racial discrimina-
tion in public or private education. See 639 F.2d at 153.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2024.
19. Id.
20. Id. See Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314
(E.D.N.C. 1977).
21. 103 S. Ct. at 2024. See 436 F. Supp. at 1316.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2024-25. See 436 F. Supp. at 1319. The district court pointed out that
racial discrimination in education violated federal policy, and that therefore Goldsboro must
be denied the benefits of tax exemptions. In addition, the court rejected Goldsboro's claim
that denial of tax-exempt status violated the first amendment. See 436 F. Supp. at 1318-19.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2036. See Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 644
F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981).
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the Supreme Court upheld the decisions handed down by the
fourth circuit, holding that neither petitioner was entitled to tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3). 2' The Court rejected the
first argument raised by petitioners, declaring that the interpreta-
tion of section 501(c)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was cor-
rect.26 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, 26 the Court
stated that in order for an organization to qualify for tax-exempt
status, it had to meet certain common law standards of charity.
2 7
Explaining those standards, the Chief Justice stated that an organ-
ization seeking tax exemptions had to serve a public purpose and
could not be contrary to established public policy.2 He further
clarified the "charitable" concept when he indicated that charita-
ble exemptions are justified on the basis that the organization in
question had conferred a public benefit and is consistent with the
public interest.29 In addition, the Chief Justice stated that for an
organization to warrant exemptions under section 501(c)(3), its
purpose could not be so at odds with fundamental public policy as
to nullify any public benefit it might otherwise have conferred. 30
After rejecting the first argument raised by petitioners, the
Court went on to consider the question of whether the IRS had
exceeded its authority when it applied sections 501(c)(3) and 170
to schools involved in this case."1 The Court determined that it
had not. According to Chief Justice Burger, Congress granted the
IRS broad authority to interpret and apply the various sections of
the Internal Revenue Code. 2 The Chief Justice noted that with
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2036.
25. Id. at 2030. The first argument petitioners raised was that the IRS's 1970 interpre-
tation of section 501(c)(3) was incorrect. They emphasized that there was an absence of any
language in the statute expressly requiring all exempt organizations to be "charitable" in
the common law sense. The Court responded by noting that it was a well established princi-
ple of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute
if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute. Id. at 2025.
26. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined in
Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Powell joined in Part III of the majority opinion, and
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist filed
a dissenting opinion.
27. 103 S. Ct. at 2026.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2028.
30. Id. at 2029.
31. In their second argument, petitioners contended that even if the IRS's 1970 inter-
pretation was correct, the IRS had exceeded its authority in implementing that interpreta-
tion. In effect, the petitioners were claiming that the IRS was not authorized to make deter-




regard to sections 170 and 501(c)(3), the IRS had the responsibil-
ity, in the first instance, of deciding whether an institution was
"charitable." ss This in turn required the IRS to determine whether
an organization's activities were so repugnant to fundamental pub-
lic policy that it could no longer be considered to provide a public
benefit worthy of "charitable" status.
84
The Chief Justice also noted that the IRS policy was completely
consistent with the positions adopted by all three branches of the
federal government." According to the Chief Justice, the decisions
of the executive, legislative and judicial branches handed down
before 1970, expressed a firm national policy condemning racial
discrimination. 6 Since the petitioners discriminated on the basis
of race, the Chief Justice determined that they were "affirmatively
at odds" with the fundamental policy of the entire government and
so could not be seen as "exercising a beneficial and stablizing in-
fluenc[e] in community life." The Court thus held that they were
not "charitable" within the meaning of sections 170 and
501(c)(3).3 7 The Chief Justice concluded, therefore, that the IRS
acted properly when it denied petitioners the privilege of tax ex-
emptions, and had not exceeded its authority.
3 8
Having disposed of this second issue, the court proceeded to re-
ject the petitioners' constitutional challenge, holding that denial of
tax benefits in this case did not violate the first amendment.3 9 The
Chief Justice noted that although the free exercise clause prohibits
33. Id. at 2032.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954). See also Titles IV and VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-6, 2000d;
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1971; Fair Housing
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. § 3601; The Emergency School Aid
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 354 (repealed 1979); The Emergency School Aid
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2252, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. 1980). See
also Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. (1943-48 comp.); Exec. Order No. 9988, 3 C.F.R. 726,
729 (1943-48 comp.); Exec. Order No. 10730, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1954-58 comp.); Exec. Order No.
11197, 3 C.F.R. 278 (1964-65 comp.); Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-70 comp.);
Exec. Order No. 11764, 3 C.F.R. 849 (1971-75 comp.); Exec. Order No. 11250, 3 C.F.R. 298
(1981).
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2032. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170 (1983).
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2032.
39. Id. at 2034-36. Petitioners argued that even if the IRS policy was valid with re-
spect to nonreligious private schools, that policy could not be applied to religious institu-




government regulation of religious beliefs,40 and provides protec-
tion for lawful conduct based on those beliefs,41 the state may limit
religious freedom in order to further a compelling governmental in-
terest.42 The Chief Justice concluded that in this instance the gov-
ernment had just such an interest.' s The Chief Justice stated that
the government has a fundamental interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education and that that interest substantially
outweighs whatever hardship denial of tax benefits places on peti-
tioners' exercise of their religious beliefs.44 The only question left
for the Court to consider was whether the IRS correctly concluded
that Bob Jones University practiced racial discrimination.45 In a
brief discussion, the Court noted that its decisions established that
the university's restrictions on racial affiliation and association
were a form of racial discrimination.4' Thus, the Court concluded
that the IRS determination was correct.4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that he was not
convinced that the critical question in determining eligibility for
tax-exempt status was whether an organization provided a "public
benefit" as defined by the Court.4 Justice Powell also noted that
certain passages in the Court's opinion suggested that the principal
function of a tax-exempt institution was to act on behalf of the
federal government in implementing only governmentally ap-
proved policies.49 In his opinion, such a view ignored the role that
40. Id. at 2034. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2034. See Thompson v. Review Bd. of the Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 402-03.
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2035. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2035.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2036. The university claimed that it did not discriminate. It emphasized that
since 1975 it had permitted all races to attend, subject only to the restrictions concerning
interracial dating and marriage. Id.
46. Id. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2036.
48. Id. at 2037 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Ac-
cording to Justice Powell, over 100,000 organizations filed section 501(c)(3) tax returns in
1981. He found it impossible to believe that all or even most of them met the Court's public
benefit-public interest test. Justice Powell also noted that he was not convinced that the
petitioners in this case provided nothing of benefit to the community. In his opinion, be-
cause of the secular character of their curricula, petitioners at the very least provided educa-
tional benefits. Id. at 2037-38.
49. Id. at 2038.
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tax exemptions played in encouraging diversity in our society.50 Fi-
nally, Justice Powell mentioned that while it was necessary to bal-
ance various interests in order to determine whether tax benefits
should be granted, Congress, not the IRS, should undertake this
delicate task.5' Justice Powell added that he could not agree with
the Court's position that the IRS should make determinations con-
cerning public policy.52 In his opinion, the IRS was created to ad-
minister laws designed to produce revenue, not to promote public
policy.
53
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that al-
though a strong national policy against racial discrimination exists,
Congress failed to manifest any intent that such a policy required
the IRS to deny tax benefits to any organization that practiced ra-
cial discrimination." According to Justice Rehnquist, Congress had
simply failed to make any determination as to whether it was
proper to grant tax benefits to racially discriminatory institu-
tions.5 5 After noting Congress' failure to act, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the Court could not legislate for it." He noted that
neither the language of sections 501(c)(3) and 170, nor the long
legislative history underlying those sections supported the result
reached by the Court. 7 In his opinion, the Court had stretched the
requirements for tax benefits beyond the limits intended by Con-
gress.58 He concluded, therefore, that the Court erred when it gave
its approval to the IRS's controversial policy.
From 1913 to 1964, the federal government granted favorable tax
status to private schools practicing racial discrimination.5 ' In 1965,
however, the Court temporarily ended this practice when it im-
posed a freeze on future extensions of tax-exempt status to schools
maintaining racially discriminatory admissions policies.60 Shortly
after the freeze was lifted,6' the District Court for the District of
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2039.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2040 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2039 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2044 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. See 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 289, 290 (1975).
60. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970) (three judge panel). Between
October 15, 1965 and August 2, 1967, action was taken with regard to applications for tax-
exempt status filed by schools practicing racial discrimination. Id. at 1130.
61. On August 2, 1967, the IRS resumed its practice of reviewing applications for tax-
1985
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Columbia decided Green v. Kennedy,6 2 a case involving a suit
brought by the parents of Black children attending public school
in Mississippi, in which they sought to enjoin the IRS from grant-
ing tax exemptions to any Mississippi school which excluded
Blacks on account of their race.63 After determining that tax ex-
emptions and charitable deductions represent a "substantial and
significant support" for racial discrimination in private educa-
tion,6 ' the district court concluded that the plaintiffs "had 'a rea-
sonable probability of success' on the merits of their constitutional
claims." 5 Accordingly , the court issued a preliminary injunction
ordering the IRS to withhold tax benefits from Mississippi schools
that discriminated on the basis of race.
6 6
In response to Green v. Kennedy, the IRS announced that it
could no longer allow racially discriminatory private schools to
take advantage of the tax benefits provided under sections
501(c)(3) and 170.67 According to the IRS, schools practicing racial
discrimination did not qualify for tax benefits under a new inter-
pretation of section 501(c)(3) which allegedly required tax-exempt
organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense.68
Shortly after the IRS announced its new policy, the District
Court for the District of Columbia decided Green v. Connally,a' a
case in which the court granted the permanent relief requested ini-
tially by the petitioners in Green v. Kennedy.70 In the course of
exempt status:
[E]xemption[s] will be denied and contributions not be deductible if the operation of
the school is on a segregated basis and its involvement with the state or political
subdivision is such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a violation of the
laws of the United States. Where, however, the school is private and does not have
such degree of involvement with political subdivisions as has been determined by the
Courts to constitute State action for constitutional purposes, rulings will be issued
holding the school exempt and the contributions to be deductible assuming that all
other requirements of the statute are met.
IRS News Release, August 2, 1967, reprinted in 1967 STAN. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) T 6734.
62. 309 F. Supp. at 1127. In the news release the IRS took the position that private
segregated schools are entitled to receive tax exemptions unless the state's involvement with
the schools is so great as to render the operation of the school unconstitutional. See supra
note 60.
63. Id. at 1127.
64. Id. at 1134.
65. Id. at 1132.
66. Id. at 1140.
67. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2021 (1983).
68. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
69. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), affd mem. sub. nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
70. 330 F. Supp. at 1170-73.
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the Connally decision, the district court gave its consent to the
IRS construction of the Internal Revenue Code. 1 Writing for the
court, Judge Leventhal stated that a strong argument could be
made for interpreting the tax laws in accordance with the law of
charitable trusts. 72 He noted, however, that the actual reason for
upholding the IRS construction was that a contrary interpretation
of section 501(c)(3) would raise serious constitutional questions. 3
According to the judge, tax exemptions and deductions constituted
federal support7' which the government probably could not extend
to discriminatory private schools without violating the Constitu-
tion.75 Judge Leventhal's decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Coit v. Green.7
Even before the district court had announced its decision in
Green v. Connally, the IRS began enforcing its controversial new
tax policy. In the fall of 1970 the service informed Bob Jones Uni-
versity of its intention to revoke the tax-exempt status of private
schools practicing racial discrimination. 77 In response, the univer-
sity brought suit in federal district court where it sought injunctive
relief to restrain the IRS from terminating or threatening to termi-
nate its tax exempt status.78 That suit culminated in Bob Jones
University v. Simon,7 in which the Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court decision, remanding the case for dismissal ° on the
grounds that the university's claim was covered by the Anti-In-
junction Act which prohibits the federal courts from granting in-
junctive relief prior to the assessment or collection of any tax.s"
Since the Anti-Injunction Act barred Bob Jones University from
challenging the IRS policy until after it had been enforced and
taxes had been collected, the Supreme Court was not directly
called upon to decide the question of whether segregated private
schools qualify for tax exemptions under section 501(c)(3). Never-
theless, the Court did manage to comment briefly on the subject.
71. Id. at 1164.
72. See id. at 1157-61.
73. Id. at 1164.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1165.
76. 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
77. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983).
78. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 227 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d
903 (4th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 476 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1973), afl'd, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
79. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
80. Id. at 750. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 476 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1973).
81. 416 U.S. at 730-32. See I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1983).
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In the latter part of its opinion, the Court indicated that by the
time Green v. Connally had been affirmed on appeal the case was
moot.82 The Court concluded, therefore, that its affirmance of that
decision lacked "the precedential weight of a case involving a truly
adversary controversy."8 In effect, the Court's remarks reopened
the question of whether discriminatory private schools were enti-
tled to receive tax benefits under sections 501(c)(3) and 170. This
question was finally disposed of, however, with the Court's decision
Bob Jones University v. United States.
The Bob Jones decision stands at the end of a long line of cases
decided in connection with the federal government's campaign
against racial discrimination in both public and private education.
This campaign began in 1954, when the Supreme Court decided
Brown v. Board of Education84 and Bolling v. Sharpe."5 In Brown,
the Court held that racial segregation in public education is uncon-
stitutional.86 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren stated
that separate educational facilities for blacks and whites were in-
herently unequal.87 He concluded, therefore, that the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from
requiring racial segregation in the public schools. 8 In Boiling v.
Sharpe, the Court held that the constitutional prohibition an-
nounced in Brown v. Board of Education applied to the federal
government by way of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 89 Therefore, in Boiling, the Court concluded that the federal
government could no longer maintain a system of segregated public
schools in the District of Columbia.9
Taken together, the Brown and Boling decisions established
only that the Constitution does not permit the state and federal
governments to engage directly in racial discrimination by operat-
82. See 416 U.S. at 740 n.11.
83. Id.
84. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
85. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
86. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 495.
87. Id. at 495.
88. See id. at 483-95. See also Boling, 347 U.S. at 500.
89. 347 U.S. at 500. According to the Court, "[s]egregation in public education is not
reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro chil-
dren of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their
liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause." Id.
90. Id. at 500. Chief Justice Warren maintained that: "[in view of our decision that
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it




ing their own racially segregated public schools. In Norwood v.
Harrison,"' however, the Court indicated that the Constitution also
prohibits the government form indirectly discriminating by sup-
porting racial segregation in private schools.92 In effect, by cutting
off government support, the Norwood Court had placed a serious
financial burden on private schools practicing racial segregation.
This burden was further increased by the withdrawal of tax ex-
emptions and charitable deductions. Therefore, it appears that Bob
Jones is an extension of the Norwood decision. This, however, is
not entirely true.
In Norwood and cases that preceded it, the federal courts took a
strong stand against racial discrimination in education. In most of
these cases the federal judiciary used the Constitution to strike
down programs or policies which tended to perpetuate the practice
of racial discrimination in both public and private schools. In Bob
Jones, however, the Supreme Court departed from this constitu-
tional approach.9" Instead, the Court simply adopted an interpre-
91. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
92. Id. Norwood involved a Mississippi textbook loan program under which the state
purchased textbooks and loaned them free of charge to students in both public and private
schools without regard to whether the participating private schools maintained racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies. In a unanimous decision, the Court overturned a district
court decision sustaining the validity of the Mississippi program. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger stated that the Constitution obligated the states not only to avoid
operating their own racially segregated public schools but also to refrain from providing
significant financial assistance to private schools practicing racial discrimination. The Chief
Justice determined that the textbook program offered the sort of assistance that the Consti-
tution prohibited the states from providing. He concluded, therefore, that the Mississippi
program, as currently administered, was unconstitutional. Id. at 469-70. See also Norwood
v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
The Norwood decision was one of several cases in which the federal courts scrutinized
state programs that provided financial support for private schools practicing racial discrimi-
nation. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973) (use of public
facilities); Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972) (lease of
school buildings); Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
915 (1971) (sale of school building); United States v. Tunica County School Dist., 323 F.
Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), afl'd, 440 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) (salary payments to private
school teachers); Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n., 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969)
(tuition grants); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n., 275 F. Supp.. 833 (E.D.
Va. 1967), affd mem., 389 U.S. 571 (1968) (tuition grants); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem. sub nom., Wallace v. United States, 389
U.S. 215 (1967) (tuition grants); Griffin v. Board of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965)
(tuition grants); Pettaway v. Surry County School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va.), aff'd
sub nom., Griffin v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964) (scholarships
and transportation grants); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala.
1964) (grants-in-aid).
93. This departure comes as a surprise when one considers that prior to the Norwood
decision the Supreme Court had indicated that tax benefits constitute a direct form of gov-
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tation of the Internal Revenue Code, which alleviated the need to
resort to the Constitution. This is not at all unusual. On many oc-
casions the Court has refused to invalidate government action on
constitutional grounds whenever it could achieve the same result
through interpretation of a state or federal statute. 4
Although the Court has taken this statutory approach quite fre-
quently in the past, its application in Bob Jones is inappropriate
because the rationale supporting the Court's interpretation of sec-
tions 501(c)(3) and 170 is essentially unsound. In Bob Jones, Chief
Justice Burger stated that the IRS was correct in concluding that
organizations must not violate public policy if they want to receive
tax benefits under sections 501(c)(3) and 170. 5 The Chief Justice
reached this conclusion after noting that Congress used a list of
organizations in section 170 to define the term "charitable contri-
bution." 96 He went on to point out that this same list is found in
section 501(c)(3) 7 From this he concluded that Congress must
have intended for tax-exempt organizations to be "charitable,"98
which meant that their activities or policies could not conflict with
public policy.99
While the Chief Justice's argument appears to make sense, it ac-
tually misses the point. By using a list of organizations in section
eminent support; therefore, following Norwood, one might have expected the Supreme
Court to conclude that the granting of tax benefits to segregated private schools is a form of
federal "state action" prohibited by the Constitution.
In Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Supreme Court held that while
the public schools remained closed, the state was constitutionally prohibited from providing
direct support to the parents of white children attending private segregated schools. The
support to which the Court was referring included tuition grants and tax credits. In effect,
the Court has classified tax credits as a form of direct government support. Id. at 229-32.
In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), the district court interpreted Grif-
fin and concluded that the case suggested that tax benefits were a form of direct govern-
ment support. According to the district court, the references to Griffin in Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), established "that the use of property tax credits for citizens
contributing to the 'private' schools was material as showing that the state was 'directly or
indirectly involved in the funding' of the segregated private academies and hence a segre-
gated school system." See id. at 1165 n.30.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582 n.22 (1979); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101, 105 (1944).
95. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2026, 2028 (1983).






170 to define a charitable contribution, Congress was in effect spec-
ifying the organizations to which such contributions can be made.
In other words, Congress was explicitly naming those organization
that qualified as being "charitable." Using the Court's own reason-
ing, one must conclude that since the same list is found in section
501(c)(3), those organizations are "charitable" for tax-exemption
purposes as well. The upshot of all this is that although the Court
was correct in concluding that organizations must be "charitable"
in order to qualify for tax benefits under sections 501(c)(3) and
170, Congress has already decided which organizations meet that
test. Therefore, if an organization meets the requirements listed in
sections 501(c)(3) and 170, it is "charitable" and, therefore, is enti-
tled to receive tax benefits even though its activities might conflict
with public policy.100
That the reasoning underlying the Bob Jones decision is so weak
means that in the future the decision will come under constant at-
tack. As a result, its precedential value may be greatly diminished.
Of course, the Court could have avoided this situation by simply
basing its decision on a much sturdier foundation, such as the
Constitution.01
The argument in favor of taking the constitutional approach
finds even more support in the fact that the Court's failure to use
the Constitution means that in the future, Congress is free to over-
rule the interpretation promulgated by the IRS. As a result, there
is always the possibility that racially discriminatory private schools
will again qualify for tax benefits from the federal government.
Since the federal government has a strong interest in denying pub-
lic support for racial discrimination in education, 02 the Court
should have used the Constitution to permanently prohibit Con-
gress from granting tax exemptions and charitable deductions to
schools practicing racial discrimination.
Jonathan Kaplan
100. This is basically the same argument that Justice Rehnquist was making when he
stated that Congress had explicitly defined the requirements for tax-exempt status and that
nowhere in that definition was there some additional, undefined public policy requirement.
103 S. Ct. at 2040 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. In their briefs, many of the amici curiae argued that denial of tax-exempt status
was required by the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment. 103 S. Ct. at 2032 n.24.
102. Id. at 2035 n.29.
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